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EM1PLOYER'S LIABILITY ACTS
AS TO
CO-EMPLOYEES.

CHAPTER I.
EARLY COMMON LAW RULE.
Section

1.

In England.

2. In Scotland and Ireland.
3.

In America.

Section 1.

EGommon Law Rule in England. - The doctrine of

Respondeat Superior, the most important and best knovm maxim of
the law, has one important exception known as the fellow servant
doctrine; which holds that an employer being without fault himself,
cannot be made responsible for the negligent act of one servant
causing damage to a co-servant.
courts for the first

time in

1837,

Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 M. & W.,
damages

This principle was decided by the

1.

in

the celebrated case of

In this case a servant sued for

for an inj)Xry caused by the breaking down of a negligent-

ly overloaded van.

It is easily seen that this is really not a

case of"fellow servant"at all,but it is said that it has changed
the current of decision and settled it in a new line in a more
radical and determined manner than any case ever decided.

In 1850

2.
the doctrine was again

laid down and finally established.

After

this the master was not liable to any servant for an injury arising
from the fault of a fellow servant, whether such fellow servant be
in a position of authority or not.

The construction

of the term

fellow servant is given the widest possible range (Report of
House of Commons, committee on employers liability, Parliamentary
papers, 1887.

285).

There are three notable exceptions to this rule in which cases
the master will be liable:
1. - Omission to provide suitable materials and facilities
for the work.
2. - Engaging incompetent workmen through whose fault
the damage occurs.
3. - His

(Master's) personal negligence.

Section 2. - In Scotland and Ireland. - The two first cases
in Scotland were decided against this principle, and still held
to the doctrine of "Respondeat Superior".

These two decisions

were overruled by the House of Lords on appeal, and though the
Scotch have tried to be independent in the matter their efforts
have not been successful and t'e decision of the House of Lords is
now the recognized rule in Scottish courts.

The Irish courts

have followed the rule of Priestly vs. Fowler from the first and

3.
still

hold it

to be the law.

Section 3.- In America. - The first American case on this topic
is Murray vs. S. C. R. R. Co., 1 McM., 385.
running obliquely toward the track.

It seems a horse was

The engineer thought the best

and quickest way to get rid of the difficulty was to reach the
point the horse was approaching before the horse would be able to
arrive there; for this purpose he allowed the engine full headway,
but the point was reached simultaneously and the result was that
the animal i n the flesh derailed his iron brother.
a fireman on the engine, sues for his injury.

The plaintiff,

He obtained a verdib

dict on the lower court of $1500 but the court of errors, assuming
that the engine was, as found, negligent, nevertheless held the
company not liable; the ground of the decision being that the
plaintiff knew that he was to work in concert with others to
produce a single result,

namely the running of the train.

He

knew the risks and assumed them, this much was admitted by the
nine judges.

The final point then is, does the company guarantee

the plaintiff

against the negligence

of his co-workers?

It was

held it does not so guarantee by six judges, three dissenting.
The court states that this is
point,

the first

case to be decided on this

that there must have been many similar accidents previously"

but as no question has been raised,

it

seems that every one took

it for granted that the master was not liable.

It

t

stated by

4.
those Anglo-maniacs who cannot gorgive fate for decreeing that
they should be born in Plebian America instead of Aristocratic
England, that all of our good old law as well as our new theories
come from England.

Such statements are repudiated, at least in

this one instance.

In 1841 the case of Murray vs. S. C. Ry. Co.,

although arising four years after Priestly vs. Fowler,was argued
and decided altogether independently of it, as it was cited by
neither counsel or court; and further Priestly vs. Fowler was not
in reality a true co-employee case but a case where the master
failed to provide a safe van.

The first true co-employee case

in England was in 1850, so that the American courts had preceded
the English by nine yeqrs.
The relation of master and servant exists, according to
123 U. S.,

523, wherever the employer retains the right to direct

themanner in which the business shall be done,
to be accomplished,

or in

but how it shall be done.

other words,

as well as the result

not only what

shall be done

This case holds that a master is

liable to third persons injured by the negligent act of his servant
in the course of his employment, although the master did not
authorize or know of the servant's negligent act, or even if he
disapproved or forbade it.

This rule cannot rest on agency, as

"Qui facit per alium facit per se"

is incompatable with the idea

@

As this rule

of anything against the wish of the principle.

makes a master liable when he did not authorize or approve but
even forbade the act,

it is based. neither on justicemor equity,

but has its foundation in public policy and social utility.
When one for his own benefit puts inaction a mechanism either
inianimate or human or both and through some flaw it injures a third
person, the master should be
injured,

clearly

the

master is

was for the master's benefit;
passenger's benefit,

liable to him.

If a passenger is

liable for the carrying of him

but I think it

was also for the

otherwise hewould not have paid for the privi-

lege of being carried.

The employees position is the same as

the passenger's as to the benefits derived, the difference being
the greater benefit to the servant than to the passenger.

Thus

far thdir positions ate similar but Chere remains one vital
distinction.

The passenger depends for his safety entirely

the provisions made by the master for his safe

carriage,

on

ard cannot

avoid the result of any negligence, being unable to see it; but
the servant, as ont of the employees, can see the acts of his coworkers and be cautious accordingly;
to be more careful,

and if

he may also admonish them

they are hot he may leave the. employment.

The leading case on this point is known as Farwell's Case
49, decided in 1842.

An engineer was injured by

4 Met.

the negligence of

a switchman, a careful and trustworthy man, who left a switch open.

6.

It

was held that the engineer could not recover,

servant.

being a fellow

It was stated by Chief J. Shaw, that the fountain head,

,

prolific of just decisions which seem to grow stronger as the world
grows older and wiser, that the implied contract of the master
does not extend to indemhify the servant against the negligence
of any one but himself.

The eminent judge held it

the traveling public that
wonderful combination,
as possible.

to be best for

those who are component parts of that

the modern railroad,

should be as careful

Such care would be more likely to be used by the

employees if each depended for his safety on the care of the others,
thus making them overseers of eachother's acts.

The required

care could net be obtained if

large damages were allowed

injuries

self evident that such a state of

to each other,

it

is

affairs would tend to make the employees careless.
never been overruled in England and but by one state
America.

This case has
(Tenn.) in

The English Employers Liability Act recognizes it and

only enacts exceptions to the doctrine there laid down.
rule in

for

Farwells case is

That the

oftentimes very severe and seemingly

unjust is obvious, especially vhere the plaintiff is in a wholly
different department from the one whose negligence caused the
injury.

This is recognized in 25 Fed. Rep.,837, decided in 1886.

A fireman was killed by the negligence of the engineer of another
train.

The judge held them fellow servants,

following Farwellrs

7.
case; but stated that though the principle

in Farwells case may

not be unquestionably correct, still fifty years of nniversal
application,

coupled with the eminent authority declaring it,

the rule binding on the judiciary. arn.
must come from the legislature.

rakes

a'ny change , if necessary,

CHAPTER II.
PRESENT ENGLISH LAW.
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT 1880

(42 & 43 Vict.).

The rule in England was that the master was never liable for
the negligence of a fit and competent servant, whatever his grade
might be.

This manifest hardship on the servants led to the

Employers

liability Act of 1880.

The necessity of syach an act

in America is not as keenly felt, as the

rule

of a master's

liability is samewhat different in the two countries.

In America

he cannot delegate his authority and with it his liability.
the English Employers Liability Act

As

(43 & 44 Vict.) is the founda-

tion of all later legislation on the subject, and has to a(-certain
extent influencedA judicial tribunalsfit may not be amis to state
the principle faatures of the "Act" and show how they are construed.
It states that the master my not raise the special defense of
co-employment, but that t he action will lie as if the

injured

party was not a servant of the defendant, where the injury was
due to any:
1. Defect in the condition of the,(a) Ways.
(b) Works.
(c) Machinery.
(d) Plant connected with or used in the business of the

defendant.
2. Negligence of a superintendent while acting as such.
3.

Negligence

of one whose direction

inust be followed.

4.AAct or omission of one following,(a) A rule or by-law of employer.
(b)
5.

Instructions

of another having delegated authority.

Negligence of employee having charge or control of any,(a) Signal.
(b) Points.
(c) Locomotive.
(d) Train.

The Employers Liability Bill of 1888 ammended the

"Act of

1880" by inserting "or arrangement" after"Conditinn" in

1;

and

"buildings or premises" after plant in 1 (d).
The defect must havearisen from, or not been discovered or
remedied,

owing to

the neglect

by him to see that the

of the employer or som

"Ways , works etc.

" were

in

one entrusted

proper

condit ion.
Construction of the Act.
The provision of the
is

construed to mean,

as if

"Act",

"as if

he had not

he had been one of the

been a

workman"

public,

who is

on the master's prdmises qthis invitation on business.

The

provision which gives the workman a right

a

of action

is

first

"Defect

10.
in

the conditionA way".

in 10QB. Div. 5.
two wheeled car,

The leading case on this point

is

fbund.

A workman was employed to take by means of a
uwhite hot" balls of iron to a steam hammer.

While the deaeased was running rapidly, drawing the car after him,
it struck a piece of fire brick which was placed negligently on
the "way",

the car stopped,

the deceased fell

and

the ball through

its momentum, rolling forward/fell on to him causing
injuries from which he died.

severe

His executors brought an action

the cart held, that the defect was not in

under the lAct", but

the "way*, nor in the"condition of the way", but in a negligently
One of the judges drew the !'ollowing analogies.

placed obstruction.
If

a drunken man staggered along the road would that be a defect

in

the road?

he were lying down dead drunk would that be

And if

any more of a defect?

A broken board in

the floor of a dark

passage would be a defect in the way, but a pail left there would
be an obstruction.
Scotland in

In
wise.

23 Scottish L.

R.,

108,

the rule seems otherwis

The plaimtiff, a bi'aken-an on defendants train, by order of
As

the engineer, stepped down onto the foot-board of the engine.

he did. so a bar of iron projecting from a pile of pig iron at the
side of the track, struck his foot and injured him severly.

The

court held that as the iron was piled negligently close to the
track it

created a defect in

it

and the master would be liable

for

11.
damages accruing by an injury therefrvm.

This case has been

criticised and is not considered a very strong authority.
In Pegram vs. Dixon, 55 L. J. Q.B. 447.,

the plaintiff, a

workman, was ascending a ladder through an elevator "well" in a
new building, when a board was throvm down without warning,
breaking his collar bone.
throw down rubbish.

This "way" had been previously used to

Held, no defect in the way but mrely a

negligent act of a fellow servant.

Thus it may be seen that the

Judiciary holds to a very strict construction of t1B tenn way as
set forth by the oegislative branch.
The line of demarkation seems to be that whe- the employer
has used due care and provided a safe way, the fact that some fel
low servant renders

it

dangerous does not mate the master liable

It seems to me an interesting question might arise, as to when a
simple obstruction remaining undisturbed would becone a defect.
It also seems to me that a brick removed from the "way" would be
no more of a defect than an extra brick placed on thewXay; still
the former is declared a defect qnd the latter not.
its

absence or presence,

may all

be

The cause of

the cire mtance and effect of the accident

the same, and if one is a defect so also should be the

other.
Next in order is the defect in the"Works".
is found in 17 Q. B. Div., 189.

The leading case

The plaintiff was injured by the

12.
falling d7
ed.

a wall which was to be the side of a house when cmplet-

The rule was laid down,

that as the term "ways" means ways

used in the business and not
the term"works'must have
business, the "work s"
if

the employer is

partly made ways not used,

the same construction.

To be used in

of course must be completed.

a builder a different rule

therefore
the

Obviously

would apply (building

is held to include~taking down of houses).
The rule as to defect in "machinery" is found in 16 Q. B. Div.,
52.

A machine is

defective if

the work or purpose for which it

is

point is in 22 Scottish L.

R. 698.

was given.

in

The plai ntiff

his fingers,

the door carefully.
and

used.

A better case on this

An alarm of fire

shutting the fire

and sued the owner for his injury.

up was that the plaintiff

been,

a proper condition to perform

not in

in a factory

proof door smashed
The defense set

would not have been injured had: he shut
The coLrt held,

that although the door had

could be shut without injury if

done carefully,

still

the door was made to be used "in case af.fire" and should be
able for that purpose.

In

such a case men

must act in

suit-

a hurried_

manner.
Plant includes all -paratus used by a business man fr carrying on his business (not his stock in trade); all chattels, fixed
or mavable, alive or dead, which he keeps for permanent employment
in his business, (19 Q. B. Div., 658).

The injury complained of

13.
must have been caused "by the defect" in the natural and ordinary
sequence of events.

(33 W. R. 216).

Subsection 2 of section I gives the

injured employee an action

where the negligence is of a Superintendent
his authority as such.
in l 4B. D. 585.
ship.

the exercise of

The leading case on" Superintendence" is

One B was foreman of a gang of men loaCing a

He stood by the hatchway and warned the men below when

t1-e bales were to descend; by failing
fell

in

on the

to give such warning a bale

plaintiff, who sues therefore.

Held, (by Shultz J.)

that B was not entrusted solely or principally with superintendence,
but was a co-laborer working with his hands all day.
the case as to subsection 2

of section I.

This settled

It was fuither agreed

that subsection 3 of section I applied; "by negligence of one
whose orders must be obeyed".

Hawkins and Smith J.J., state as

follows "conceding that these orders must have been obeyed", still
they fail to see where B gave an order - "thereforejif he never
gave an order/ the plaintiff could not have bound to his injury by
it".

It seems to me that this is rather a falacious reasoning.

If B had said move to the right, and the plaintiff was injured,
clearly the master would

have been liable;

if he B)says nothing

at all it is equivalent to ordering the plaintiff to stand where
he was.

The duty was placed on B to tell the men below where to

stand and a failure to tell thbm was a much greater fault than a

14.
wrong order;

the latter

would

be merely an error of judgement
It

negligence pure and simple.

while the former is

is

strange

indeed when a court will excuse the negligence the statute aims
at and punish as negligent a wrong order.

The negligent act

complained of must have been one of superintendende.
in 10 Q,. B.

Div.,

356,

the plaintiff was injured

In the case

by the

negligent

failure of his superintendent to check the movement of a crane by
a guy rope, of which the superintendent had charge.

The court

held that a.though the man in charge of the guy rope had superinteziding powers,
in

his

still

as the act which caused

capacity as a fellow workma

be liable.

In

negligence
24 Sc.

superintendent

L. R. 91.

an.

( 12 R ISc.)

injured party
done

in

negligent

between the

superintendence.

It

is

immaterial what

the one giving the order holds;

being did he have the
779)

drawn

injured by following the negligent

order of one who must be obeyed.
the employment

is

Subsection 3 of section I gives the injured

employee an action when he was

in

the-master would not

Scotland no distinction

of a

the injury was done

power

804)

the only question

to give such an order?

Subsection 4 of section I,

to recover where

the

injury is

position

caused

(3 Times L.R.
allows the
by an act

carpliance with the rules or by-laws of the employer.

Both parties are held to comtemplate the effect of such rules
except where, -

1. Employee has not equal means of knowledge.(3 Macqueen
266.)
2. Danger is immeasurably increased by absence of due
care

( 27 L. J. Ex. 325).

Subsection 5 of sectionI, requires that the negligence rpust be
of one who has charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive
or train;
them.

and not merely of one who cares for or works about

It was stated in 11 Q.

of one who cleaned, oiled and

B. D.,

at p. 22 , that the negligenc.e

inspected point boxes, was not the

negligence of one who had charge or control of them.

Such an

oiler has no more charge or control of the points, than a workman
who"taps"wheels

, to discover if they have the true ring which

precludes a flaw, has charge or control of them.
Section II, has a clause preventing recovery if the plaintiff
knew of the defect.
tion

This rule is general and is

with all the "Act".

taken in connec-

He has a ieasonable time

to

communicate

notice of the defect, unless the employer or sane superintendent
knows of it already.

Knowledge of the danger will not bar a

recovery if the master fails in some statutory duty thereto.
(As fencing a dangerous fly-Wheel, per BramwellB. in L. R.
7 Ex. 130.)
The damages under the "Act" would be the estimated earnings
during the

three years preceeding the injury, of a person in the

16,
same gradeemployment and district.

This was not a measure of

danages but merely a limit, and if the person made over time,
such could also be allowed ( 53 L. T., 999).
The "Act"

was meant only to make the employer liable in

certain caees, provided nothing was proven to the contrary
between the partiesi therefore a contract to waive the "Act" was
held valid (9 Q. B. Div., 357).

As the "Act" applied to but a lim

ited number of cases, construed strictly; and as nearly every con
contract of employment contained a "waiving clause",

( due to

the fact that warkmen were plentiful and positions scarce) the
benefits were not as far reaching as might be expected from the
terms of the acts.

CHAPTER III.
AMERICAN STATUTES
FOLLOWING THE ENGLISH ACT.
The american statutes on this subject although fo-inded on,
and to a great extent copies of the English "Act", vary in the
different states.

Those atates which have virtually reenacted

the English Act, construe it in substantially the same manner.
Most of

#:i
t

have practically reenacted it.

The study of it

is of more importance than the act of any American state except
the one in which the question at issue arrises.

When a conflict

arises as to jurisdiction, the rule in (5 Fed. R. at page 75) will
apply, which allows a state statute to be enforced in a national
court when the citizenship of the parties, or the nature

of the

subject, will permit.
The dependent condition of the employee as related to his
employer, clearly gives power to the latter to coerce the former
into contracts waiving the benefits of the "Act".
i

This being so

the American states exceptGeorgia forbid such contracts.
Carriers may not contract away their liability for negligence in
the carriage of chattels.
liability for the safetv of

To allow them to contract away their
ho se in their employ, would be the

placing of the value of a man's life and limb below the interest
they might have in the chattel.

Such waiving contracts are

18.
forbidden in,Alabama - 91 Ala. 514., 92 Ala. 218.
Massachusetts - Public statutes Chapter 74 Art. III.
Indiana - Act of 1893 Chapter 130 Art. V.
Iowa - Code 1880 Art. 1307.
But not in Georgiar 50 Ceo. 46F , 89 Geo. 318.
The Massachusetts statute is based. on the English Act.

It

provides that a workman in the exercise of due care and diligence
may recover if injured by reason of any defect in the condit ion of
the Ways Works or Machinery connected with or used in the business
of the enployer;

which arose fromor had not been

discovered or

remedied/ owing to the negligence of t-'e employer or of some one
entrusted with

the care

of them.

Section II, provides for a recovery where the negligence is
of one entrusted. with an4exercising superintendence.
SectionIII, gives a right of action where the negligence is
of one having charge or c ontrol of any signal, switch, locomotive
or train.
Section IV,

If an employer enters into a contract with ano

ther to have his work performed by the other, he will be liable
for injuries to the employees of such a contractor

due to

any

defect inthe"ways, wcrks"etc.
To constitute "ways or works",

the appliances must be of a

19.
pernanent or quassi permanent

character.

Thus a temporary staging

put up by masons is no part of the "ways or works"
The American courts

(160 Mass. 457).

Kave followed the English constructioi,

that

the"vrays or works" must be finished before a defect can be proved
under trn statute; unless the employer is a builder (160 Mass. 248
Its held in Massachusetts in (159 Mass. at p 1)

at page 252).

that where a comtractor ordered one of his men to carry a bar of
iron down a rovable staif,which slipped and caused an injury to the
workman, the contractor is not liable.

But in 159 Mass. 287, where

the injury was caused by a defective aar of a third party used
by the defendants to transport stone from their quarry,
ant was held liable.
that if

the use is

day or an hour it

The distinction

therefore,

it

is thus clearly drawn ,

to be 6f a permanent

character,

is within the statute; but if

incidental user it is not included.
seems

it

the defend-

it

if

only for a

merely an

To be within the

statute

must .be a permanent user of a finished

product adapted to produce a given result.
The forwarding of cars,
inspection(
Chapter 359,

156 Mass.
it

is

13)

formerly devolved merely the duty of

; but by the ammendatory statute of 1893

enacted that a car in

possession of a raiload

company shall be deemed to be

its "ways, works and machinery".
the

defect is

in

use by or in .the

Interesting cases

part of

arise where

the railroad of anoth.er company over which the

20.
defendant's train is passing.

Such a case is that in 156 Mass. 298

It was there laid down that it may not be necessary to render the
master liable that ,ie should own the road over which his train
runs, but he must at least have

some control over it.

It must be

used in his business by his authority, express or implied.

The

phrase, "connected with or used. in the business of the employer",
cannot be

taken literally, but must be taken in connection with

the terms "ways, works and machinery", and held to mean those used
in his business, by his alxthority and subject to his control,
The term "machine" may be defined as a combination of moving
mechanical parts, adapted to receive motion and apply it to the
production of a mechanical result

(Walker on Patant Law).

The

term machinery has a somewhat broader scope than machine, the court
in each case must decide whether the facts and

circumstances bring

it within the meaning cf the term.
A superintendent is one having the direction of employees acts,
coupled with the power of hiring and dismissing workmen.

His sole

or principle duty must be that of superintendence, and the negligence complained of must have been done in the capacity of superintendent while acting as such. (160 Mass. 131, 155 Mass. 584)
In 156 Mass 242,the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the
engineer of a stationery engine, who was also a superintendent.
The court held, that as the act complained of was done

in his

21.
capacity as a workman ard not through his authorty as a sue1 r inl
tendent,

the plaintiff

could have no recovery.

thm-dual being;vf the superintendent
laborer for others.

The law recognizes

for some purposesand a common

If the injury is caused by an obvious danger

with which the plaintiff is, or ought to be, familiar, he
recovery (150 Mass. 423,
In

has no

157 Mass. 418).

cases under the statute the evidence of the negligence is

a very important matter, at times very complex and seemingly
unjust, as for instance where a workman was injured by the caving
of the sides of a ditch due to lack of shoring.
ed to show that it
the accident.

Plaintiff attempt-

had been properly shored up immediately after

The court stated that such evidence must beexcluded,

as a subsequent use of a

particular safeguard. is no more evidence

of prior negligence, than a subsequent lack of caution would be
evidence of former care and diligence.
like reasoning backwards but

This looks remarkably

the above is

unquestionably

the old

and well established rule.
When a person sues for injuries by a train, the negligence
must have been of one having charge or control of the train, but
it my have been only a temporary charge

(156 Mass. 262).

a railroad means upon the road proper and moving or prepared
move

(156 Mass.

The train itself

13 at pape 18,

164 Mass.,

may be one ormore

Upon
to

296 at page 301).

cars with ar without a locomotive

22.
(159 Mass. 348).

Formerly a locomotive was required to be attached

to bring it within themeaning of the term.

(153 Mass. 112).

The Alabama statute is a virtual copy of the Massachusetts
act and is construed in substantially the same manner.
cases

arise where the plaintiff is a non-resident.

Very often

The question

then resolves itself into whether the statute is a part of the
contract of employment.

The contract of employment merely creates

the relation of master and. servant, the statute tien acts on
the incidents of such a velation.

Therefore the liability under

the statute does not arise from the contract of employment, but
is an obligation based on a given set of circumstances within the
state (97 Ala., 126).
Ah employee having notice Gf

a defect cannot recover for an

injury therefrom unless such defec t was known to the master and he
had time to remedy it (11 S. R. 733).

Until such notice the

eniployee may pre sume there are no defects (17 S. R. 452).

The

plaintiffin his complaint, when alleging a defect, must also allege
that it

was not discovered or remedied owing to the negligence

of the master, or some one by him authorized to care for it (85
Ala.,

272).

When he enters the employment the employee of course

accepts all patent
covers a defect,

defects; it follows naturally that if he dis-

in the course of his employmaat, he assumes it

also,unless he gives notice, in which case he may wait a reasonable
time for its correction

(97 Ala., 359).

23.
In the case reported in 17 S. R., at page 30 an engineer ran
his engine with great force against a stop block, placed on the end
The fact that the

of a trestle, tearing it up and toppling over.

stop block was very defective did not give the plaintiff a right
of action, because no matter how good the stop block might have
been madq,,it co-ld not have withstood the shock.

The defect

in the 'ways etc." must be an inherent part of them.

In 97

Ala.,

at page 240 the plaintiff a switchman was about to alight from
a moving train, to do which it wa. necessary to swing out from
th.

side of the train before dropping to the ground.

plaintiff swung

out he struck a car

As the

which was placed on a

switch within a foot of the min track.

The courtstated, that as

the Alabama "Act" was a copy of the English "Act",the decisions of
the English courts handed down shortly after

its passale, have

very great influence with the American courts !This

influence,

owing to the circumstances, was much greater than is ordinarilly
due the learning and ability of t1ose courts.
that

It seems to me

if the whole switch was within twelve inches of the main track

it would be a defect in the condition o2 such main track, as soon
as cars were placed on the switch.

Some part of any switch must

necessarilty be within twelve inches of the main track, not of
itself a detect, but when cars are placed on that portion which
is within a foot it should be held a defect therein,

one car so

24.
placed would have the same unenviable quality of sweeping unsuspecting trainmen from the

side ladders, as wuuld a whole train.

In either case there would be the same point of cantact, namely th2
the-first car within twelve inches of the main

track.

A track

being so near a wall that a trainman was injured thereby
a defect in the "ways"

(14 S. R., 175).

was held

I think a car is as

dangerous as a wall if placed too near the track.
If an employee is injured by a defect, while he is breaking
a rule, in using such defective contricance, he cannot recover
(12 S. R. 273 - 294 - 714). A railroad company under the statute,
4s at commn law, is bound to provide safe ard. reasonable mahhinery

but is not obliged to have the "newest thing out", thought it may
be a safer appliance.

But I think the two appliances mAght be

cempared before the jury to show if reasonable care had been used
in providing safe machinery.
Superintendence is the power possessed by one over the men and
appliances used in the work.
injured person,
is liable

but if

It need not hate been over the

the negligence injures any servant the mastEr

(97 Ala., 245), unless the plaintiff is guilty of

contributoty negligence.

This latter can only be excused by

wanton, careless or intentional negligence on defendant's part.,
One having control of a stationary engine need not necessarily be

25.

receives not
gang is

usually a fellow servant

but is

a superintendent,

gives orders.

The foreman of a section

(14 S. R. 10).

held to be a superintendent

in

; because he

13 S.

R.

308.

The section

of the "Act" relating to those having charge or control, excludes
any-one having control in
company

(14 S.

R.

209).

breach of a rule or regulation of the
A section foreman in

car comes within the rule,(ll

charge of a hand.

0-of

r_c

S.

R.

262).

The injury complained of must havebenn received while undertaking the particular service called for in 1his contract of employment, or while obeying the orders of a superior.

If

he is

iijured

while engaged in some service by way of accoldation he cannot
recover (85 Ala 203).

The burden of pzmving negligence under the

statute lies on the plaintiff (84 Ala. 133).

The early law of Georgia provided that when one engages
to serve a rpaster,

he undertakes to run the

isk of his employment,

including that arising fron the negligence of fellow servants
(15 Geo., 534).

This rule did not apply to hired slaves.;

first, because they were chattels,
second, because they had no choice butto obey orders
(1 Ga. 195).
In

1855 the following "Act"

3036).

If

was passed in

the person injured is

Georgia (Code , section

himself an employee,

being caused by another employee; and if

the damage

the plaintiff was without

26.
fault

This was held not to apply to the receivers

he may recover.

of a railroad holding possession of it

for a court of chancery.

The plaintiff cannot rec.over if he is at fault himself, even
though acting under directions of a superior

(55 Ga.

sam rule holds as to his using a defective contrivance,
user would be a fault

(55 Ga.

133).

The

279).

as such a

The only excuse for an

employee w ho goes beyond his own sphere and is

injured, is

necessity, of the which the jury are to be judges

(53 Ga. G630).

Section 3033 of the code provides that recovery can be had
f or,
first, Damage to persons, stock or other property caused
by the runnin', of trains or other machinery.
second,

damge done by any person in the service of the

company,unless reasonable care and diligence was used.
Section 3034 provides that no recovery can be had when the injury
was caused by the negligence or with the consent of the pl]aintiff;
if

both are negligent then the darages shall be reduced in

proportion to the plaintiff's

fault.

Section 3036

3034,

(belonging after

enacts that even if

an employee

is

where

it

was in

the old code),

injured he may recover if

he

be

without fault.
Section 2083 states that as railrpad companies h ave many employees
who cannot possibly

control those who should

diligence in the running of traiqs,

exercise

care and

the company should be

liable

27.
to such employees for want of such care and diligence.

Under

this last clause the question arises, must the injury be caused
by the "running of trains" alonel
with 3033,:then it
includes part
(64 Ga.,

If 2083 is taken in connection

will be seen that 2083 refers to 3033 anC

II as well as I

of that section (ante page 26).

509).

Construing the sections to(ether the law seems to be that the
company

shall be liable for any injury caused by negligently rune

ing trains in

their service

or employment,

or any other negligence

except,
first, where the plaintiffs negligence alone caused the injuryi
(whether or not he is

an employee).

second, if partly at fault/the damagesbe given according to
the degree of fault (not applying to employees).
third, if any fault is shown on the plaintiff's part (he
being an employee).
The fault of the plaintiff,
something to do with the injury.
by the

caving

in of dirt

to bar his recovery,

must have had.

Where an engineer was injured

, the fact that he had a brother engineer

on board, against the rules of the company, is no bar to his
recovery (63 Ga., 181).
Section 3033 of the code,states

that the presumption in

is

61 Ga.

against the company.

the presumption is

Iut in

153 it

against the company every

is
ti

all

cases

held tlhat though
e and on every

28.
issue, after the fact of the killing on the defendant's road if
proven; still when it is shovm either that the plaintiff by his
own negligence caused the injury,

or that the comeany was not

negligent, the burden is shifted because either will relieve the
company.

In 30 Ga., at page 150 is found what seems to me the

true rule in so called fellow servant cases.

The doctrine of fellow

servant is one of public policy to secure better service and safer
transportation for both servants and passengers, by making eachone
look after and encourage the carefullness of the rest.

Surely

this reasoning can have no application to employees who

have no

I

connect~g-influences over eachother.
of a penalty,

the rule is in the nature

and to impose a penalty where there is

no chaice of

exercising that care it was meant to enforce is sheer cruelty.
If

a railway company permits another to run cars over its

it

is

still

liable for &ll

accidents due to Aegligence,

road,
because

the legislature gave the franchise on the credit of the owner's
capital that his privileges could not be abused (49 Ala.,
The Florida law

need not be discussed at length as it

copy of the law of Georgia an. is
manner, at least in

355).

so far as is

therefore

construed in

is

the same

not inconsistent with the general

legislation in Florida on the subject

(15 S. R.

is

( page 764).as follows,

found in

chapter 3744 section 2346

fellow servant may recover,

if

a

882).

The statute
a

injured through the negligence of a

co-worker, provided he is without fault himself.
In Mississipi it is provided that an emploype of a railroad

29,
company shall have the sane action for injury caused by any act
or omission of the corporation or its employees, as is allowed by
law to others not employees, where the injury results from the negligence of an employee dngaged in another department of labor
( sec. 193 of Const. of 1890).

The only question to arise under

this "Act" will be as to the distinction of departments.

It ha,

been held under it that an engineer and telegraph operator are not
in the same department.

So also as to a fireman on one train and

the engineer on another train of the same company.
The Missouri law on the subject is in a peculiar position
owing to the abstuusness of the statute itself, and the position
taken by the court in its construction.

The statute

(R. S. 1889

sec. 4425 ) enacts in substance, that whenever any person shall
die

from an injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence,

unskillfulness or criminal intent of any officer, agent, servant or
enployee in the employ of a trasnportation company, the master
shall b@ liable,; and

whenever any passeng.hr shall die from an

injury owing to any defect in the railroad, steamboat or etc., or
from the negligence, carelessness or criminal intent above declared
the master shall be liable.
Section 4426 gives a right of action to the representatives
of the deaeased in a case where he himself could have recovered
if the injuries 7ad not resulted in death.

30.
In

36 Mo.

at p 13 the court held that the statute meant what

the natural import of the wordsseemed to imply; that is if anyone
was killed through the above specified negligence,
would lie against the ccmpany.
(159Mo., 285Y.

In

an action

This holding was reversed in

this latter

case

the judge,,that the decisicn

in the former case was not based on logical grounds.
tation thus given allowed the

employee

The interpre-

rights which he did not

before possess (an action for inj-ries due to the negligence of a
co-servant).

It is not natural that the legislature would take

away the enployees

clear rigit of action for an injury due

to defective machinery, and give him a new right of action against
common usage and of questionable utility;
to the fault %of a co-servant.

namely,

fbr injury due

There are further objections,

section 4425 so construed, gives the widow $5,000.00 if her
husband is

killed outright by the negligence of a fellow servant;

while the following section allows no such action in a
injury merely.

case of

Thus $5,000.00 would be allowed to a widow if

husband was killed outright,

but no recovery could be

lost his arms or legs, or both.

Arecovery at law is

compensation for the loss of the head of a family;

had if

her
he

given as a

such a rule

would allow one damages for being negligently deprived of an
income,

but would give him nothingif the inco-le were turned into a

31.
source of expense.

It seems that the eminent judge endeavored

by taking the whole "Act" into consideration, to eliminate the
distinction arising

from a liberal construction of the tenn "any

person"as used in the first clause, andto hold it as excluding
fellow servants froc its benefits.

The "Act" was passed in 1855.

The court in 1865 held that the term "any person", meant exactly
what it said, ard. thus included fellow servants.

This construetion

was not questioned by the courts until 1875, twehty years after
its passage.

In the meantime the Legislature knowing the first

construction placed on its "Act" anrnot objecting, proves that
the construction met with its approval.

That this interpretation

met with the ppproval of the People, Bar, Court and Legislature
during the ten years following 1865, hould of itself cause
much hesitation before so peremptorially overruling it as to place
the stigma of ignorance upon them.

Section 2 an(; 3 can be

distinguished on the ground that while the widav receives $5,000.00
for the negligent of her husband; the successor of the

passenger

has'his $5,000.00 against the owner of the negligently defective
contrivance.

Section 2 is penal, (shallforfeit or pay) while

3 is compensatory ("shall be liable to an action for damages).
It would seem from the great diffenence between the inherent natun
of section 2 and 3 that they should not be construed together, so
as to eliminate the clear meaning of either or part of either.

32.
The prime reason for the latter construstion seems to be that it
coincides with the fellowserva-t doctrine of the comnn law,
the theoretical benefit of which is that it tends to make each
servant his "brother's keeper" in a certain sense.
his coservant

If one sees

is generally negligent and liable to cause him

injury, for which he will have

no recovery, he will naturally

report such negligence and have it eliminated.

But is this not

likely to make the master careless as to the quality or conduct
of his servants.
doctrine is

Let it be granted that the fellow servant

salutory.

except as to death.

The rule is
But there

is

the same under t} e statute,
a distinction which gives good

reasoh for the statutory exception.

The fact that ones wife will

receive $5,000.00 for his death will not make him ary the less
careful to preserve his life.

In the existing state of marital

relations, it would probably tend to make him more careful, and
not allow the successor of his connubial joys the added benefit
of ki=c statutory recovery.
statute,

Hard cases are presumed under the

as where recovery is

allowed far a man's death but not

for an injury :hichl leaves him a charge on his family.

Such cases

may be flagined under any law instituted by the human mind..

To be

absolutely equitable a law must have come from 0mnip~tence itself,
which would be able to forsee all cases.

'The co-mon law, which

has grovm under the fostering care of oLw

"great Judges" does

33.
not at all times cover all cases.

How much more unlikely is the

Legislature on its first passage of a single act to arrange it
to cover all cases imaginable.

The mere fact that a law does not

apply equitably to all

no reason that it

cases

is

as to the cases it does cover.
a prime rule of

is

not good law

The Missouri courts seem to override

onstruction laid dovm by Brett 1. R. in (Gibbs

vs. The Great Western Ry. Co.,
an "Act"

is

L-assed for

12 Q. B. Div., 208 - 211),

the benefit

courts not to construe it

strictly

of workmen it

is

that if

the duty of the

as against workmen.

In Iowa (Code Sec. 2002) every corporation is liable for
all damages sustained by aby perwon, including employees of such

corporation,

in

consequence of the neglect of agents,

or by the

mismanagement of the engineer's or other employees of the
corporation, and in consequence of the willful wrongs, 1-hether of
commission o)r omission of such agents, engineers, or other
employees, when

:uch wrongs are in any manner co nnected with

the use and operation of any railroad,

on or about which they

shall be employed,

and no contract which restricts

shall be binding.

Unlike the atatute of Georgia,

under the above may be obtained

t-e judgment

a,-ainst a receiver and satisfied

out of the property of the corporation
If

such liability

(62 Iowa,

the act be within the scdpe of his authority

728).
the c mpany is

34.
liable even though such act be willfully wrongful (64 Iowa 568).
As this statute is in

derogation of the common law it is

It is held to cover only those enga-ed in

construed strictly.

the running of the railway.
who wipes engines,
it

It

does not cover the case of one

keeps a turn table free from snow and. operates

(65 Iowa 417),nor does it include employees in the machine

shops of the company

(46 Iowa 399),

and

car repairers are not,

within its purview (64 Iowa 644).
It seems therefore t at the cotirt holds the statute as meanin7
the hazarduos work of the running of trains rather than the
running of a railway.
In Indiana we find a virtual copy of the English Act,except
that the knowledge of a co-worker's incompetency is held the
same as knowledge of a defect
master by the employ e if
incompetency.
plaintiff

If

and must be communicated to the

he knew or ought to have known of such

accidents happen without the state,

being a resident of the state,on a railroad

through the state the master will be liable.

the
running

All contracts of

release by the employee, and rules ar regulations of the master
to the same effect are held invalid.
7083 - 7087)

In

(Indiana Statutes 1894,

Sec.

both Indiana and. Iowa we find statutes prohibit-

ing the black listin- of discharged employees.
The Colorado statube is

a virtual copy of the English Act.

We have seen that originally the master was liable
theacts of his servant (Respondeat Superior),.

for all

This was found

to be such a hardship on the master that he was released from all
responsibiity for the nggligent acts of his servants as between
eachother

(Fellow Servant doctrine) .

When this rule was laid down,

it

had indoubtedly the godd

and salutory effect of making each co-employee's defenseless
position a check on the carelessness of himself and. his fellows.
But tiie wonderful gvowth of corporations,
of labor,

and the specialization

separating each one of a group from all

inflence of those in

another department,

contkactk or

have ibade the members

of each group as entirely independent of each ol her as if
under bifferent masters.

they wer

They really are under different masters,

for obviously the saperintendent of a certain de-ar-ment has no
influence over and. is
corporate

business.

independentof every other division of the
Clearly a servant,in one group,

acting as a

component part thereof, can have no effect on or influence over
a member of another;
rule has ceased,

therefore as41

reaso-

for the fellow servant

the rule should follow the reason.

the "different department
solution of the question.

doctrine" is

and. ought

Thus it seems

to be the correct

